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Secure Multi-party Computation for
Cloud-based Control
Andreea B. Alexandru and George J. Pappas
Abstract In this chapter, we will explore the cloud-outsourced privacy-preserving
computation of a controller on encryptedmeasurements from a (possibly distributed)
system, taking into account the challenges introduced by the dynamical nature of
the data. The privacy notion used in this work is that of cryptographic multi-party
privacy, i.e., the computation of a functionality should not reveal anything more
than what can be inferred only from the inputs and outputs of the functionality. The
main theoretical concept used towards this goal is Homomorphic Encryption, which
allows the evaluation of sums and products on encrypted data, and, when combined
with other cryptographic techniques, such as Secret Sharing, results in a powerful
tool for solving a wide range of secure multi-party problems. We will rigorously
define these concepts and discuss how multi-party privacy can be enforced in the
implementation of a Model Predictive Controller, which encompasses computing
stabilizing control actions by solving an optimization problem on encrypted data.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing has become a ubiquitous tool in the age of big data and
geographically-spread systems, due to the capabilities of resource pooling, broad
network access, rapid elasticity, measured service and on-demand self-service, as
defined by NIST [55]. The computational power and storage space of a cloud service
can be distributed over multiple servers. Cloud computing has been employed for
machine learning applications in e.g., healthcare monitoring and social networks,
smart grid control and other control engineering applications, and integration with
the Internet of Things paradigm [69, 15]. However, these capabilities do not come
without risks. The security and privacy concerns of cloud computing range from
Andreea B. Alexandru, George J. Pappas
University of Pennsylvania, Department of Electrical Engineering, Philadelphia, PA, USA, e-mail:
aandreea@seas.upenn.edu,pappasg@seas.upenn.edu
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
09
65
2v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  2
3 J
un
 20
19
2 Andreea B. Alexandru and George J. Pappas
communication security to leaking and tampering with the stored data or interfering
with the computation, that can be maliciously or unintentionally exploited by the
cloud provider or the other tenants of the service [6, 75, 47]. In this chapter, we will
focus on concerns related to the privacy of the data and computation. These issues
can be addressed by the cryptographic tools described below.
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) encompasses a range of crypto-
graphic techniques that facilitate joint computation over secret data distributed be-
tween multiple parties, that can be both clients and servers. The goal of SMPC is that
each party is only allowed to learn its own result of the computation, and no interme-
diary results such as inputs or outputs of other parties or other partial information.
The concept of SMPC originates from [81], where a secure solution to the million-
aire’s problemwas proposed. Surveys on SMPC can be found in [26]. SMPC involves
communication between parties and can include individual or hybrid approaches be-
tween techniques such as secret sharing [73, 64, 10], oblivious transfer [60, 66],
garbled circuits [81, 43, 11], (threshold) homomorphic encryption [70, 39, 59] etc.
Homomorphic Encryption (HE), introduced in [70] as privacy homomorphism,
refers to a secure computation technique that allows evaluating computations on
encrypted data and produces an encrypted result. HE is best suited when there is a
client-server scenario with an untrusted server: the client simply has to encrypt its
data and send it to the server, which performs the computations on the encrypted data
and returns the encrypted result. The first HE schemes were partial, meaning that
they either allowed the evaluation of additions or multiplications, but not both. Then,
somewhat homomorphic schemes were developed, which allowed a limited number
of both operations. One of the bottlenecks for obtaining an unlimited number of
operations was the accumulation of noise introduced by one operation, which could
eventually prevent the correct decryption. The first fully homomorphic encryption
scheme that allowed the evaluation of both additions and multiplications on en-
crypted data was developed in [38], where, starting from a somewhat homomorphic
encryption scheme, a bootstrapping operation was introduced. Bootstrapping allows
to obliviously evaluate the scheme’s decryption circuit and reduces the ciphertext
noise. Other fully homomorphic encryption schemes include [18, 16, 36, 40, 17, 23].
For a thorough history and description of HE, see the survey [53]. Privacy solutions
based on HE were proposed for genome matching, national security and critical in-
frastructure, healthcare databases,machine learning applications and control systems
etc. [7, 8, 68]. Of particular interest to us are the the works in control applications
with HE, see [45, 51, 37, 72, 4, 58, 5], to name a few. Furthermore, there has been a
soaring interest in homomorphically encrypted machine learning applications, from
statistical analysis and data mining [8] to deep learning [68].
Over the past decades, efforts in optimizing the computation and implementa-
tion of SMPC techniques, along with the improvement of network communication
speed and more powerful hardware, have opened the way of SMPC deployment
in real-world applications. Nevertheless, in the context of big data and the inter-
net of things, which bring enormous amounts of data and large number of devices
that want to participate in the computation, SMPC techniques lag behind plaintext
computations due to the computational and communication bottleneck [56, 57, 22].
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The privacy definition for SMPC stipulates that the privacy of the inputs and
intermediary results is ensured, but the output, which is a function of the inputs of
all parties, is revealed. For applications such as smart meter aggregation [2], social
media activity [71], health records [31], deep learning [1], and where output privacy
is valued over output accuracy, the SMPC privacy definition is not enough [82] and
needs to be augmented by guarantees of differential privacy.
Differential Privacy (DP) refers to methods of concealing the information leak-
age from the result of the computation, even when having access to auxiliary infor-
mation [33, 32]. Intuitively, the contribution of the input of each individual to the
output should be hidden from those who access the computation results. To achieve
this, a carefully chosen noise is added to each entry such that the statistical properties
of the database are preserved [35], which introduces a trade-off between utility and
privacy.When applied in a distributed system [34, 46, 76], DP provides a problematic
solution for smaller number of entries in the dataset, as all parties would add noise
that would completely drown the result of the computation. Several works combine
SMPC with DP in order to achieve both computation privacy and output privacy, for
instance [67, 74, 65, 21, 77]. An intuitive comparison between privacy-preserving
centralized and decentralized computation approaches, with different privacy goals
and utilities is given in Table 1, taken from [77].
Model Utility Privacy Who Holds the Data
Fully Homomorphic (or
Functional) Encryption
any desired query everything (except possibly
the result of the query)
untrusted server
Secure Multi-Party
Computation
any desired query everything other than result
of the query
original users or del-
egates
Centralized Differential
Privacy
statistical analysis
of dataset
individual-specific
information
trusted curator
Multi-Party Differential
Privacy
statistical analysis
of dataset
individual-specific
information
original users or del-
egates
Table 1 Comparison between centralized and multi-party privacy-preserving approaches [77].
In this chapter, we focus on proposing SMPC schemes for optimization and
control problems, where we require the convergence and accuracy of the results.
The scenario we consider will involve multiple clients and untrusted server(s). DP
techniques can be further investigated in order to ensure output privacy, but we will
not explore this avenue in the present chapter.
1.1 Dynamical data challenges
Cryptographic techniques were developed mainly for static data, such as databases,
or independent messages. However, dynamical systems are iterative processes that
generate structured and dependent data. Moreover, output data at one iteration/time
step will often be an input to the computation at the next one. Hence, special
attention is needed when using cryptographic techniques in solving optimization
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problems and implementing control schemes. For example, values encrypted with
homomorphic encryption schemeswill require ciphertext refreshing or bootstrapping
if the multiplicative depth of the algorithm exceeds the multiplicative depth of the
scheme; when using garbled circuits, a different circuit has to be generated for
different iterations/time steps of the same algorithm; the controlled noise added for
differential privacy at each iteration/time step will accumulate and drown the result
etc. Furthermore, privacy is guaranteed as long as the keys and randomness are never
reused, but freshly generated for each time step; then, the (possibly offline) phase in
which uncorrelated randomness is generated, (independent from the actual inputs),
has to be repeated for a continuously running process. In this chapter, we design the
solution with all these issues in mind.
1.2 Contribution and roadmap
Examples of control applications that require privacy include smart metering, crucial
infrastructure control, prevention of industrial espionage, swarms of robots deployed
in adversarial environments. In order to ensure the privacy of a control application,
i.e., secure both the signals and the model, as well as the intermediate computations,
most of the time, complex solutions have to be devised. We investigate a privacy-
preserving cloud-based Model Predictive Control application, which, at a high level,
requires privately computing additions, multiplications, comparisons and oblivious
updates. Our solution encompasses several SMPC techniques: homomorphic en-
cryption, secret sharing, oblivious transfer. The purpose of this chapter is to describe
these cryptographic techniques and show how to combine them in order to build
private cloud-based protocols that produce the desired control actions.
The layout of the chapter is as follows: in Section 2, we describe the model
predictive control problem that we address, we show how to compute the control
action when there are no privacy requirements and we outline the privacy-preserving
solution. In Section 3, we formally describe the adversarial model and privacy defi-
nition we seek for our multi-party computation problem. In Section 4, we introduce
the cryptographic tools that we will use in our solution and their properties. Then,
in Section 5, we design the multi-party protocol for the model predictive control
problem with encrypted states and model and prove its privacy. Finally, we discuss
some details about the requirements of the proposed protocol in Section 6.
1.3 Notation
Weuse bold-face lower case for vectors, e.g., x, and bold-face upper case formatrices,
e.g., A. N denotes the set of non-negative integers, Z denotes the set of integers, ZN
denotes the additive group of integers modulo N . For n ∈ N, let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
λ denotes the security parameter and 1λ is a standard cryptographic notation for
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the unary representation of λ, given as input to algorithms. E(x) and [[x]] represent
encryptions of the scalar value x. We use the same notation for multidimensional
objects: an encryption of a matrix A is denoted by E(A) (or [[A]]) and is performed
element-wise. A function f : Z≥q → R is called negligible if for all c ∈ R>0, there
exists n0 ∈ Z≥1 such that for all integers n ≥ n0, we have | f (n)| ≤ 1/nc . {0, 1}∗
defines a sequence of bits of unspecified length.
2 Model Predictive Control
We consider a discrete-time linear time-invariant system:
x(t + 1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t),
x(t) = [x1(t)ᵀ . . . xM (t)ᵀ] , u(t) = [u1(t)ᵀ . . . uM (t)ᵀ] , (1)
with the state x ∈ X ⊆ Rn and the control input u ∈ U ⊆ Rm. The system can be
either centralized or partitioned in subsytems for i ∈ [M], xi(t) ∈ Rni , ∑Mi=1 ni = n
and ui(t) ∈ Rmi , ∑Mi=1 mi = m. The subsystems can be thought of as different agents
or clients. We will address a privacy problem – the agents desire to keep their local
data private – so it is more reasonable to consider partitions rather than a non-empty
intersection of the states and control inputs.
The Model Predictive Control (MPC) is the optimal control receding horizon
problem with constraints written as:
J∗N (x(t)) = minu0,...,uN−1
1
2
(
xᵀNPxN +
N−1∑
k=0
xᵀ
k
Qxk + uᵀkRuk
)
s.t. xk+1 = Axk + Buk, k = 0, . . . , N − 1; x0 = x(t);
uk ∈ U, k = 0, . . . , N − 1,
(2)
where N is the length of the horizon and P,Q,R  0 are cost matrices. We consider
input constrained systems with box constraints 0 ∈ U = {lu  u  hu}, and impose
stability without a terminal state constraint, but with appropriately chosen costs and
horizon, such that the closed-loop system has robust performance to bounded errors
due to encryption. A survey on the conditions for stability of MPC is given in [54].
Through straightforward manipulations, (2) can be written as the quadratic prob-
lem (3) – see details on obtaining the matrices H and F in [13, Ch. 8,11] – in the
variable U :=
[
uᵀ0 u
ᵀ
1 . . . u
ᵀ
N−1
]ᵀ. For simplicity, we keep the same notationU for
the augmented constraint set. After obtaining the optimal solution, the first m com-
ponents of U∗(x(t)) are applied as input to the system (1): u∗(x(t)) = {U∗(x(t))}1:m.
U∗(x(t)) = arg min
U∈U
1
2
UᵀHU + UᵀFᵀx(t). (3)
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2.1 Solution without privacy requirements
The privacy-absent cloud-MPC problem is depicted in Figure 1. The system (1)
is composed of M subsystems, that can be thought of as different agents, which
measure their states and receive control actions, and of a setup entity which holds
the system’s model and parameters. The control decision problem is solved at the
cloud level, by a cloud controller, which receives the system’s model and parameters,
the measurements, as well as the constraint sets imposed by each subsystem. The
control inputs are then applied by one virtual actuator. Examples of such architecture
include a smart building temperature control application, where the subsystems are
apartments and the actuator is a machine in the basement, or the subsystems are
robots in a swarm coordination application and the actuator is a ground control that
sends them waypoints.
Fig. 1 Cloud-based MPC problem for a system composed of a number of subsystems that measure
their states and a setup entity which holds the system’s model and parameters. The control action
is computed by a cloud controller and sent to a virtual actuator.
The constraint setU is a hyperbox, so the projection step required for solving (3)
has a closed form solution, denoted by ΠU(·) and the optimization problem can be
efficiently solved with the projected Fast Gradient Method (FGM) [61], given in (4):
For k = 0 . . . ,K − 1
tk ←
(
IMm − 1LH
)
zk − 1LF
ᵀx(t) (4a)
Uk+1 ← ΠU(tk) (4b)
zk+1 ← (1 + η)Uk+1 − ηUk (4c)
where z0 ← U0. The objective function is strongly convex, since H  0, therefore
we can use the constant step sizes L = λmax(H) and η = (
√
κ(H) − 1)/(√κ(H) + 1),
where κ(H) is the condition number of H. Warm starting can be used at subsequent
time steps of the receding horizon problem by using part of the previous solutionUK
to construct a feasible initial iterate of the new optimization problem.
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2.2 Privacy objectives and overview of solution
The system model and MPC costs A,B,P,Q,R are known only to the system, but
not to the cloud and actuator, hence, the matrices H,F in (3) are also private. The
measurements and constraints are not known to parties other than the corresponding
subsystem and should remain private, such that the sensitive information of the
subsystems is concealed. The control inputs should not be known by the cloud.
The goal of this work is to design a private cloud-outsourced version of the
fast gradient method in (4) for the model predictive control problem, such that the
actuator obtains the control action u∗(t) for system (1), without learning anything
else in the process and with only a minimum amount of computation. At the same
time, the cloud controller should not learn anything other than what was known
prior to the computation about the measurements x(t), the control inputs u∗(t), the
constraints U, and the system model H,F. We formally introduce the adversarial
model and multi-party privacy definition in Section 3.
As a primer to our private solution to the MPC problem, we briefly mention here
the cryptographic tools used to achieve privacy. We will encrypt the data with a
labeled homomorphic encryption scheme, which allows us to evaluate an unlimited
number of additions and one multiplication over encrypted data. The labeled homo-
morphic encryption builds on top of an additively homomorphic encryption scheme,
which allows only the evaluation of additions over encrypted data, a secret sharing
scheme, which enables the splitting of a message into two random shares, that cannot
be used individually to retrieve the message, and a pseudorandom generator that,
given a key and a small seed, called label, outputs a larger sequence of bits that is
indistinguishable from random. The right choice of labels is essential for a seamless
application of labeled homomorphic encryption on dynamical data, and we choose
the labels to be the time steps at which the data is generated. These tools ensure
that we can evaluate polynomials on the private data. Furthermore, the computations
for determining the control action also involve projections on a feasible hyperbox.
To achieve this in a private way, we make use of two-party private comparison that
involves exchanges of encrypted bits between two parties, and oblivious transfer, that
allows us to choose a value out of many values when the index is secret. These cryp-
tographic tools will be described in detail in Section 4, and our private cloud-based
MPC solution that incorporates them will be presented in Section 5.
We present a standard framework in this chapter, but the same tools can be also
applied on variations of the problem and architecture.
3 Adversarial model and Privacy definition
In cloud applications, the service provider has to deliver the contracted service that
was agreed upon, otherwise the clients switch to another service provider. This
incentivizes the cloud to not alter the data it receives. The clients’ interest is to
obtain the correct result for the service they pay for, so we may assume they do not
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alter the data sent to the cloud. However, the parties can locally process copies of
the data they receive in any fashion they want. This adversarial model is known as
semi-honest, which is defined formally as follows:
Definition 1 (Semi-honest model [42, Ch. 7]) A party is semi-honest if it does not
deviate from the steps of the protocol, but may store the transcript of the messages
exchanged and its internal coin tosses, as well as process the data received in order
to learn more information than stipulated by the protocol.
This model also holds when considering eavesdroppers on the communication
channels.Malicious and active adversaries – that diverge from the protocols or tamper
with the messages – are not considered in this chapter. Privacy against malicious
adversaries can be obtained by introducing zero-knowledge proofs and commitment
schemes, at the cost of a computational overhead [42, 29].
We introduce some concepts necessary for the multi-party privacy definitions. An
ensemble X = {Xσ}σ∈N is a sequence of random variables ranging over strings of
bits of length polynomial in σ, arising from distributions defined over a finite set Ω.
Definition 2 (Statistical indistinguishability [41, Ch. 3]) The ensembles X =
{Xσ}σ∈N and Y = {Yσ}σ∈N are statistically indistinguishable, denoted s≡, if for
every positive polynomial p, and all sufficiently large σ:
SD[Xσ,Yσ] := 12
∑
α∈Ω
 Pr[Xσ = α] − Pr[Yσ = α] < 1p(σ) .
The quantity on the left is called the statistical distance between the two ensembles.
It can be proved that two ensembles are statistically indistinguishable if no algo-
rithm can distinguish between them. Statistical indistinguishability holds against
computationally unbounded adversaries. Computational indistinguishability is a
weaker notion of the statistical version, as follows:
Definition 3 (Computational Indistinguishability [41, Ch. 3]) The ensembles X =
{Xσ}σ∈N and Y = {Yσ}σ∈N are computationally indistinguishable, denoted c≡, if
for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}, called the
distinguisher, every positive polynomial p, and all sufficiently large σ: Pr
x←Xσ
[D(x) = 1] − Pr
y←Yσ
[D(y) = 1] < 1
p(σ) .
Let us now look at the privacy definition that is considered in secure multi-party
computation, that makes use of the real and ideal world paradigms. Consider a
multi-party protocol Π that executes a functionality f = ( f1, . . . , fp) on inputs
I = (I1, . . . , Ip) and produces an output f (I) = ( f1(I), . . . , fp(I)) in the following
way: the parties have their inputs, then exchange messages between themselves in
order to obtain an output. If an adversary corrupts a party (or a set of parties) in
this real world, after the execution of the protocol, it will have access to its (their)
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input, the messages received and its (their) output. In an ideal world, there is a
trusted incorruptible party that takes the inputs from all the parties, computes the
functionality on them, and then sends to each party its output. In this ideal world,
an adversary that corrupts a party (or a set of parties) will only have access to its
(their) input and output. This concept is illustrated for three parties in Figure 2. We
then say that a multi-party protocol achieves computational privacy if, for each party,
what a computationally bounded adversary finds out from the real world execution
is equivalent to what it finds out from the ideal-world execution.
Fig. 2 Real and ideal paradigms for secure multi-party computation.
The formal definition is the following:
Definition 4 (Multi-party privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behavior [42, Ch. 7]) Let
f : ({0, 1}∗)p → ({0, 1}∗)p be a p-ary functionality, where fi(x1, . . . , xp) de-
notes the i-th element of f (x1, . . . , xp). Denote the inputs by x¯ = (x1, . . . , xp).
For I = {i1, . . . , it } ⊂ [p], we let fI (x¯) denote the subsequence fi1 (x¯), . . . , fit (x¯),
which models a coalition of a number of parties. Let Π be a p-party protocol that
computes f . The view of the i-th party during an execution of Π on the inputs x¯,
denoted VΠi (x¯), is (xi, coins,m1, . . . ,mt ), where coins represents the outcome of the
i’th party’s internal coin tosses, and mj represents the j-th message it has received.
We let the view of a coalition be denoted by VΠI (x¯) = (I,VΠi1 (x¯), . . . ,VΠit (x¯)). For
a deterministic functionality f , we say that Π privately computes f if there exist
simulators S, such that, for every I ⊂ [p], it holds that, for x¯t = (xi1, . . . , xit ):{
S(I, x¯t, fI (x¯))
}
x¯∈({0,1}∗)p
c≡ {VΠI (x¯)} x¯∈({0,1}∗)p .
This definition assumes the correctness of the protocol, i.e., the probability that
the output of the parties is not equal to the result of the functionality applied to
the inputs is negligible [42, 52]. Auxiliary inputs, which are inputs that capture
additional information available to each of the parties, (e.g., local configurations,
side-information), are implicit in this definition [42, Ch. 7], [41, Ch. 4].
Definition 4 states that the view of any of the parties participating in the protocol,
on each possible set of inputs, can be simulated based only on its own input and
output. For parties that have no assigned input and output, like the cloud server in
our problem, Definition 4 captures the strongest desired privacy model.
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4 Cryptographic tools
4.1 Secret sharing
Secret sharing [73, 64] is a tool that distributes a private message to a number
of parties, by splitting it into random shares. Then, the private message can be
reconstructed only by an authorized subset of parties, which combine their shares.
One common and simple scheme is the additive 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme,
which involves a party splitting its secret message m ∈ G, whereG is a finite abelian
group, into two shares, in the followingway: generate uniformly at randoman element
b ∈ G, subtract it from the message and then distribute the shares b and m − b. This
can be also thought of as a one-time pad [78, 12] variant on G. Both shares are
needed in order to recover the secret. The 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme achieves
perfect secrecy, which means that the shares of two distinct messages are uniformly
distributed on G [25].
We will also use an additive blinding scheme weaker than secret sharing (neces-
sary for the private comparison protocol in Section 4.5): for messages of l bits, b
will be generated from a message spaceM with length of λ + l bits, where λ is the
security parameter, with the requirement that λ + l-bit messages can still be repre-
sented inM, i.e., there is no wrap-around and overflow. The distribution of m + b is
statistically indistinguishable from a random number sampled of l + λ + 1 bits. Such
a scheme is commonly employed for blinding messages, for instance in [79, 49, 14].
4.2 Pseudorandom generators
Pseudorandom generators are efficient deterministic functions that expand short
seeds into longer pseudorandom bit sequences, that are computationally indistin-
guishable from truly random sequences. More details can be found in [41, Ch. 3].
4.3 Homomorphic Encryption
Let E(·) denote a generic encryption primitive, with domain the space of private data,
called plaintexts, and codomain the space of encrypted data, called ciphertexts. E(·)
also takes as input the public key, and probabilistic encryption primitives also take a
random number. The decryption primitive D(·) is defined on the space of ciphertexts
and takes values on the space of plaintexts. D(·) also takes as input the private
key. Additively homomorphic schemes satisfy the property that there exists an
operator ⊕ defined on the space of ciphertexts such that:
E(a) ⊕ E(b) ⊂ E(a + b), (5)
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for any plaintexts a, b supported by the scheme. We use set inclusion instead of
equality because the encryption of a message is not unique in probabilistic cryp-
tosystems. Intuitively, equation (5) means that by performing this operation on the
two encrypted messages, we obtain a ciphertext that is equivalent to the encryption
of the sum of the two plaintexts. Formally, the decryption primitive D(·) is a ho-
momorphism between the group of ciphertexts with the operator ⊕ and the group
of plaintexts with addition +, which justifies the name of the scheme. It is imme-
diate to see that if a scheme supports addition between encrypted messages, it will
also support subtraction, by adding the additive inverse, and multiplication between
an integer plaintext and an encrypted message, obtained by adding the encrypted
messages for the corresponding number of times.
Furthermore, multiplicatively homomorphic schemes satisfy the property that
there exists an operator ⊗ defined on the space of ciphertexts such that:
E(a) ⊗ E(b) ⊂ E(a · b), (6)
for any plaintexts a, b supported by the scheme. If the same scheme satisfies both (5)
and (6) for an unlimited amount of operations, it is called fully homomorphic. If a
scheme satisfies both (5) and (6) but only for a limited amount of operations, it is
called somewhat homomorphic.
Remark 1 A homomorphic cryptosystem is malleable, which means that a party that
does not have the private key can alter a ciphertext such that another valid cipher-
text is obtained. Malleability is a desirable property in order to achieve third-party
outsourced computation on encrypted data, but allows ciphertext attacks. In this
work, we assume that the parties have access to authenticated channels, therefore an
adversary cannot alter the messages sent by the honest parties.
4.3.1 Additively homomorphic cryptosystem
Additively Homomorphic Encryptions schemes, abbreviated as AHE, allow a party
that only has encryptions of two messages to obtain an encryption of their sum
and can be instantiated by various public key additively homomorphic encryption
schemes such as [44, 63, 30, 50]. LetAHE =( ˆKeyGen, Eˆ, Dˆ, ˆAdd, ˆcMlt) be an instance
of an asymmetric additively homomorphic encryption scheme, withM the message
space and Cˆ the ciphertext space, where we will use the following abstract notation:
⊕ˆ denotes the addition on Cˆ and ⊗ˆ denotes the multiplication between a plaintext
and a ciphertext. We save the notation without ˆ(·) for the scheme in Section 4.3.2.
Asymmetric or public key cryptosystems involve a pair of keys: a public key that is
disseminated publicly, and which is used for the encryption of the private messages,
and a private key which is known only to its owner, used for the decryption of the
encrypted messages. We will denote the encryption of a message m ∈ M by [[m]]
as a shorthand notation for Eˆ(public key,m).
1. ˆKeyGen(1σ): Takes the security parameter σ and outputs a public key pˆk and a
private key sˆk.
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2. Eˆ(pˆk,m): Takes the public key and a message m ∈ M and outputs a ciphertext
[[m]] ∈ Cˆ.
3. Dˆ(sˆk, c): Takes the private key and a ciphertext c ∈ Cˆ and outputs the message
that was encrypted m′ ∈ M.
4. ˆAdd(c1, c2): Takes ciphertexts c1, c2 ∈ Cˆ and outputs ciphertext c = c1⊕ˆc2 ∈ Cˆ
such that: Dˆ(sˆk, c) = Dˆ(sˆk, c1) + Dˆ(sˆk, c2).
5. ˆcMlt(m1, c2): Takes plaintext m1 ∈ M and ciphertext c2 ∈ Cˆ and outputs cipher-
text c = m1⊗ˆc2 ∈ Cˆ such that: Dˆ(sˆk, c) = m1 · Dˆ(sˆk, c2).
In this chapter, we use the popular Paillier encryption [63], that has plaintext
space ZN and ciphertext space (ZN2 )∗. Any other AHE scheme that is semantically
secure [44], [42, Ch. 4] and circuit-private [19] can be employed.
4.3.2 Labeled homomorphic encryption
The model predictive control problem from Figure 1, and more general control de-
cision problems as well, can be abstracted in the following general framework in
Figure 3. Consider a cloud server that collects encrypted data from several clients.
The data represents time series and is labeled with the corresponding time. A re-
quester makes queries that can be written as multivariate polynomials over the data
stored at the cloud server and solicits the result.
Fig. 3 The clients send their private data (collected over T time steps or stored in a buffer) to a
cloud server. A requester sends a query to the cloud, which evaluates it on the data and sends the
result to the requester.
Labeled Homomorphic Encryption (LabHE) can process data frommultiple users
with different private keys, as long as the requesting party has a master key. This
scheme makes use of the fact that the decryptor (or requester in Figure 3) knows the
query to be executed on the encrypted data, which we will refer to as a program.
Furthermore, we want a cloud server that only has access to the encrypted data to
be able to perform the program on the encrypted data and the decryptor to be able
to decrypt the result. To this end, the inputs to the program need to be uniquely
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identified. Therefore, an encryptor (or client in Figure 3) assigns a unique label to
each message and sends the encrypted data along with the corresponding encrypted
labels to the server. Labels can be time instances, locations, id numbers etc.
Denote byM the message space. An admissible function for LabHE f :Mn →
M is a multivariate polynomial of degree 2 on n variables. A program that has
labeled inputs is called a labeled program [9]:
Definition 5 A labeled program P is a tuple ( f , τ1, . . . , τn) where f :Mn →M is
an admissible function on n variables and τi ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the label of the i-th input
of f . Given t programs P1, . . . ,Pt and an admissible function g : Mt → M, the
composed program Pg is obtained by evaluating g on the outputs of P1, . . . ,Pt , and
can be denoted compactly as Pg = g(P1, . . . ,Pt ). The labeled inputs of Pg are all
the distinct labeled inputs of P1, . . . ,Pt .
Let fid : M → M be the identity function and τ ∈ {0, 1}∗ be a label. Denote
the identity program for input label τ by Iτ = ( fid, τ). Any labeled program P =
( f , τ1, . . . , τn), as in Definition 5, can be expressed as the composition of n identity
programs P = f (Iτ1, . . . ,Iτn ).
LabHE is constructed from anAHE schemewith the requirement that themessage
space must be a public ring in which one can efficiently sample elements uniformly
at random. The idea is that an encryptor splits their private message as described in
Section 4.1 into a random value (secret) and the difference between the message and
the secret. For efficiency, instead of taking the secret to be a uniformly random value,
we take it to be the output of a pseudorandom generator applied to the corresponding
label. The label acts like the seed of the pseudo-random generator. The encryptor
then forms the LabHE ciphertext from the encryption of the first share along with the
second share, yielding E(m) = (m − b, [[b]]), as described in Step 1 in the following.
This enables us to compute one multiplication of two encrypted values and decrypt
it, using the observation (7), as described in Steps 4 and 5.
m1 · m2 − b1 · b2 = (m1 − b1) · (m2 − b2) + b1 · (m2 − b2) + b2 · (m1 − b1). (7)
LetM be the message space of the AHE scheme, L ⊂ {0, 1}∗ denote a finite set
of labels and F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}∗ →M be a pseudorandom function that takes as
inputs a key of size k polynomial in σ the security parameter, and a label from L.
Then LabHE is defined as a tuple LabHE = (Init,KeyGen,E,Eval,D):
1. Init(1σ): Takes the security parameter σ and outputs master secret key msk and
master public key mpk for AHE.
2. KeyGen(mpk): Takes the master public key mpk and outputs for each user i a user
secret key uski and a user public key upki.
3. E(mpk, upk, τ,m): Takes the master public key, a user public key, a label τ ∈ L
and a message m ∈ M and outputs a ciphertext C = (a, β). It is composed of an
online and offline part:
• Off-E(usk, τ): Computes the secret b← F(usk, τ) and outputs Coff = (b, [[b]]).
• On-E(Coff,m): Outputs C = (m − b, [[b]]) =: (a, β) ∈ M × Cˆ.
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4. Eval(mpk, f ,C1, . . . ,Ct ): Takes the master public key, an admissible function
f :Mt →M, t ciphertexts and returns a ciphertext C. Eval is composed of the
following building blocks:
• Mlt(C1,C2): Takes Ci = (ai, βi) ∈ M × Cˆ for i = 1, 2 and outputs
C = [[a1 · a2]]⊕ˆ(a1⊗ˆβ2)⊕ˆ(a2⊗ˆβ1) = [[m1 · m2 − b1 · b2]] =: α ∈ Cˆ.
• Add(C1,C2): If Ci = (ai, βi) ∈ M × Cˆ for i = 1, 2, then outputs C = (a1 + a2,
β1⊕ˆβ2) =: (a, β) ∈ M × Cˆ. If both Ci = αi ∈ Cˆ, for i = 1, 2, then outputs
C = α1⊕ˆα2 =: α ∈ Cˆ. If C1 = (a1, β1) ∈ M × Cˆ and C2 = α2 ∈ Cˆ, then outputs
C = (a1, β1⊕ˆα2) =: (a, β) ∈ M × Cˆ.
• cMlt(c,C ′): Takes a plaintext c ∈ M and a ciphertext C ′. If C ′ = (a′, β′) ∈
M × Cˆ, outputs C = (c · a′, c⊗ˆβ′) =: (a, β) ∈ M × Cˆ. If C ′ = α′ ∈ Cˆ, outputs
C = c⊗ˆα′ =: α ∈ Cˆ.
5. D(msk, usk1,...,t,P,C): Takes the master secret key, a vector of t user secret keys,
a labeled program P and a ciphertext C. It has an online and an offline part:
• Off-D(msk,P): Parses P as ( f , τ1, . . . , τt ). For i ∈ [t], it computes the secrets
bi = F(uski, τi), b = f (b1, . . . , bt ) and outputs mskP(msk, b).
• On-D(skP,C): If C = (a, β) ∈ M × Cˆ: either output (i) m = a + b or (ii) output
m = a + Dˆ(msk, β). If C ∈ Cˆ, output m = Dˆ(msk,C) + b.
The cost of an online encryption is the cost of an addition in M. The cost of
online decryption is independent of P and only depends on the complexity of Dˆ.
Semantic security characterizes the security of a cryptosystem. The definition of
semantic security is sometimes given as a cryptographic game [44].
Definition 6 (Semantic Security [42, Ch. 5]) An encryption scheme is semantically
secure if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm,A, there exists a proba-
bilistic polynomial-time algorithmA ′ such that for every two polynomially bounded
functions f , h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗, for any probability ensemble {Xσ}σ∈N of length
polynomial in σ, for any positive polynomial p and sufficiently large σ:
Pr [A(E(Xσ), h(Xσ), 1σ) = f (Xσ)] < Pr [A ′(h(Xσ), 1σ) = f (Xσ)] + 1p(σ),
The probability is taken over the ensemble Xσ and the internal coin tosses inA,A ′.
Under the assumption of decisional composite residuosity [63], the Paillier
scheme is semantically secure and has indistinguishable encryptions. Moreover, the
LabHE scheme satisfies semantic security given that the underlying homomorphic
encryption scheme is semantically secure and the function F is pseudorandom.
In [9] it is proved that LabHE also satisfies context-hiding (decrypting the cipher-
text does not reveal anything about the inputs of the computed function, only the
result of the function on those inputs).
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4.4 Oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer is a technique used when one party wants to obtain a secret from a
set of secrets held by another party [42, Ch. 7]. Party A has k secrets (σ0, . . . , σk−1)
and party B has an index i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. The goal of A is to transmit the i-th
secret requested by the receiver without knowing the value of the index i, while B
does not learn anything other than σi . This is called 1-out-of-k oblivious transfer.
There are many constructions of oblivious transfer that achieve security as in the
two-party version of the simulation definition (Definition 4). Many improvements in
efficiency, e.g., precomputation, and security have been proposed, see e.g., [48, 62].
We will use the standard 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, where the inputs of party
A are [[σ0]], [[σ1]] and party B holds i ∈ {0, 1} and the secret key and has to
obtain σi . We will denote this by σi ← OT([[σ0]], [[σ1]], i, sˆk). We will also use a
variant where party A has to obliviously obtain the AHE-encrypted [[σi]], and A has
[[σ0]], [[σ1]] and party B holds i, for i ∈ {0, 1}, and the secret key. We will denote
this variant by [[σi]] ← OT′([[σ0]], [[σ1]], i, sˆk).
Theway the variantOT′works is that A chooses at random r0, r1 from themessage
spaceM, and sends shares of themessages toB: [[v0]] := ˆAdd([[σ0]], [[r0]]), [[v1]] :=
ˆAdd([[σ1]], [[r1]]). B selects vi and sends back to A the encryption of the index i: [[i]]
and ˆAdd([[vi]], [[0]]), such that A cannot obtain information about i by comparing
the value it received with the values it sent. Then, A computes:
[[σi]] = ˆAdd
(
[[vi]], ˆcMlt(r0, ˆAdd([[i]], [[−1]])), ˆcMlt(−r1, [[i]])
)
.
Proposition 1 [[σi]] ← OT′([[σ0]], [[σ1]], i, sˆk) is private w.r.t. Definition 4.
Wewill show in the following proof how to construct the simulators inDefinition 4
in order to prove the privacy of the oblivious transfer variant we use.
Proof Let us construct the view of A, with inputs pˆk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]] and output [[σi]]:
VA(pˆk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]]) =
(
pˆk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], r0, r1, [[i]], [[vi]], [[σi]], coins
)
,
where coins are the random values used for encrypting r0 and r1 and [[−1]]. The
view of party B, that has inputs i, pˆk, sˆk and no output, is:
VB(i, pˆk, sˆk) =
(
i, pˆk, sˆk, [[v0]], [[v1]], coins
)
,
where coins are the random values used for encrypting vi , i and 0.
Now let us construct a simulator SA that generates an indistinguishable view from
party A. SA takes as inputs pˆk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], [[σi]] and generates r˜0 and r˜1 as random
values in M. It then selects a random bit i˜ and encrypts it with pˆk and computes
[[v˜i]] = ˆAdd
([[σi]], ˆcMlt(−r˜0, ˆAdd([[˜i]], [[−1]])), ˆcMlt(r˜1, [[˜i]])) . It also generatescoins for three encryptions. SA outputs:
SA(pˆk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], [[σi]]) =
(
pˆk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], r˜0, r˜1, [[˜i]], [[v˜i]], [[σi]], coins) .
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First, r˜0, r˜1 and coins are statistically indistinguishable from r0, r1 and coins be-
cause they were generated from the same distributions. Second, [[˜i]] and [[v˜i]]
are indistinguishable from [[i]] and [[vi]] because AHE is semantically secure and
has indistinguishable encryptions, and because [[σi]] is a refreshed value of [[σ0]]
or [[σ1]]. This means A cannot learn any information about i, hence [[i]] looks
like the encryption of a random bit, i.e., like [[˜i]]. Thus, VA(pˆk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]]) c≡
SA(pˆk, [[σ0]], [[σ1]], [[σi]]).
A simulator SB for party B takes as inputs i, pˆk, sˆk and generates two random
values fromM, names them v˜0 and v˜1 and encrypts them. It then generates coins as
random values for three encryptions. SB outputs:
SB(i, pˆk, sˆk) =
(
i, pˆk, sˆk, [[v˜0]], [[v˜1]], coins) .
First, coins are statistically indistinguishable from coins because they were gen-
erated from the same distribution. Second, v˜0 and v˜1 are also statistically indistin-
guishable from each other and from v0 and v1 due to the security of the one-time pad.
Their encryptions will also be indistinguishable. Thus, VB(i, pˆk, sˆk) c≡ SB(i, pˆk, sˆk).
4.5 Private comparison
Consider a two-party computation problem of two inputs encrypted under an encryp-
tion scheme that does not preserve the order from plaintexts to ciphertexts. A survey
on the state of the art of private comparison protocols on private inputs owned by
two parties is given in [24]. In [27, 28], Damgård, Geisler and Krøigaard describe
a protocol for secure comparison and, towards that functionality, they propose the
DGK additively homomorphic encryption scheme with the property that, given a
ciphertext and the secret key, it is efficient to determine if the encrypted value is zero
without fully decrypting it. This is useful when making decisions on bits. The au-
thors also prove the semantic security of the DGK cryptosystem under the hardness
of factoring assumption. We denote the DGK encryption of a scalar value by [·] and
use the same operations notation ⊕ˆ, 	ˆ and ⊗ˆ to abstract the addition and subtraction
between and encrypted values, respectively, the multiplication between a plaintext
and an encrypted values.
Consider two parties A and B, each having a private value α and β. Using the
binary representations of α and β, the two parties exchange l blinded and encrypted
values such that each of the parties will obtain a bit δA ∈ {0, 1} and δB ∈ {0, 1} that
satisfy the following relation: δA Y δB = (α ≤ β), after executing Protocol 2, where
Y denotes the exclusive or operation. The protocol is described in [80, Protocol
3], where an improvement of the DGK scheme is proposed. By applying some
extra steps, as in [80, Protocol 2], one can obtain a protocol for private two-party
comparisonwhere party A has two encrypted inputs with anAHE scheme [[a]], [[b]],
with a, b represented on l bits, described in Protocol 1.
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Protocol 1: Private two-party comparison with encrypted inputs using DGK
Input: A: [[a]], [[b]]; B: sˆk, skDGK
Output: B: (δ = 1) ≡ (a ≤ b)
1: A: choose uniformly at random r of l + 1 + λ bits, compute [[z]] ← [[b]]	ˆ[[a]]⊕ˆ[[2l + r]]
and send it to B. Then compute α← r mod 2l .
2: B: decrypt [[z]] and compute β ← z mod 2l .
3: A,B: execute Protocol 2.
4: B: send [[z ÷ 2l ]] and [[δB ]] to A.
5: A: [[(β < α)]] ← [[δB ]] if δA = 1 and [[(β < α)]] ← [[1]]	ˆ[[δB ]] otherwise.
6: A: compute [[δ]] ← [[z ÷ 2l ]]	ˆ([[r ÷ 2l ]]⊕ˆ[[(β < α)]]) and send it to B.
7: B: decrypts δ.
Protocol 2: Private two-party comparison with plaintext inputs using DGK
Input: A: α; B: β, skDGK
Output: A: δA; B: δB such that δA Y δB = (α ≤ β)
1: B: send the encrypted bits [βi ], 0 ≤ i < l to A.
2: for each 0 ≤ i < l do
3: A: [αi Y βi ] ← [βi ] if αi = 0 and [αi Y βi ] ← [1]⊕ˆ(−1)⊗ˆ[βi ] otherwise.
4: end for
5: A: Choose a uniformly random bit δA ∈ {0, 1}.
6: A: Compute the set L = {i |0 ≤ i < l and αi = δA }.
7: for each i ∈ L do
8: A: compute [ci ] ← [αi+1 Y βi+1]⊕ˆ . . . ⊕ˆ[αl Y βl ]) .
9: A: [ci ] ← [1]⊕ˆ[ci ] ⊕ (−1)⊗ˆ[βi ] if δA = 0 and [ci ] ← [1]⊕ˆ[ci ] otherwise.
10: end for
11: A: generate uniformly random non-zero values ri of 2t bits (see [28]), 0 ≤ i < l.
12: for each 0 ≤ i < l do
13: A: [ci ] ← ri ⊗ˆ[ci ] if i ∈ L and [ci ] ← [ri ] otherwise.
14: end for
15: A: send the values [ci ] in random order to B.
16: B: if at least one of the values ci is decrypted to zero, set δB ← 1, otherwise set δB ← 0.
Proposition 2 ( [27, 80]) Protocol 1 is private w.r.t. Definition 4.
5 MPC with encrypted model and encrypted signals
As remarked in the Introduction, in many situations it is important to protect not only
the signals (e.g., the states, measurements), but also the systemmodel. To this end, we
propose a solution that uses Labeled Homomorphic Encryption to achieve encrypted
multiplications and the private execution of MPC on encrypted data. LabHE has a
useful property called unbalanced efficiency that can be observed from Section 4.3.2
and was described in [20], which states that only the evaluator is required to perform
operations on ciphertexts, while the decryptor performs computations only on the
plaintext messages. We will employ this property by having the cloud perform the
more complex operations and the actuator the more efficient ones.
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Our protocols will consist of three phases: the offline phase, in which the com-
putations that are independent from the specific data of the users are performed, the
initialization phase, in which the computations related to the constant parameters
in the problem are performed, and the online phase, in which computations on the
variables of the problem are performed. The initialization phase can be offline, if the
constant parameters are a priori known, or online otherwise.
Figure 4 represents the private version of the MPC diagram from Figure 1, where
the quantities will be briefly described next and more in detail in Section 5.1. The
actuator holds the MPC query functionality, denoted by fMPC. Offline, the actuator
generates a pair of master keys, as described in Section 4.3.2 and publishes the
master public key. The setup and subsystems generate their secret keys and send
the corresponding public keys to the actuator. Still offline, these parties generate the
labels corresponding to their data with respect to the time stamp and the size of the
data. As explained in Section 4.3.2, the labels are crucial to achieving the encrypted
multiplications. Moreover, when generating them, it is important to make sure that
no two labels that will be encrypted with the same key are the same. When the
private data are times series, as in our problem, the labels can be easily generated
using the time steps and sizes corresponding to each signal, with no other complex
synchronization process necessary between the actors. This is shown in Protocol 3.
The setup entity sends theLabHE encryptions of the statematrices and costs to the
cloud controller before the execution begins. The subsystems send the encryptions of
the input constraints to the cloud controller, also before the execution begins. Online,
at every time step, the subsystems encrypt their measurements and send them to the
cloud. After the cloud performs the encrypted MPC query for one time step, it sends
the encrypted control input at the current time step to the actuator, which decrypts
it and inputs it to the system. In Protocol 4, we describe how the encrypted MPC
query is performed by the parties, which involves the actuator sending an encryption
of the processed result back to the cloud such that the computation can continue in
the future time steps.
Fig. 4 The setup and subsystems send their encrypted data to the cloud. The cloud has to run
the MPC algorithm on the private measurements and the system’s private matrices and send the
encrypted result to the actuator. The latter then actuates the system with the decrypted inputs.
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We will now show how to transform the FGM in Equation (4) into a private
version, using LabeledHomomorphic Encryption and private two-party comparison.
The message spaceM of the encryption schemes we use is ZN , the additive group
of integers modulo a large value N . This means that, prior to encryption, the values
have to be represented as integers. For now, assume that this preprocessing step has
been already performed. We postpone the details to Section 5.3.
First, let us write tk in (4a) as a function of Uk and Uk−1:
tk =
(
IMm − 1LH
)
zk − 1LF
ᵀx(t) =
(
IMm − 1LH
)
[(1 + η)Uk − ηUk−1] − 1LF
ᵀx(t)
= Uk + η(Uk − Uk−1) − 1LHUk −
η
L
H(Uk − Uk−1) − 1LF
ᵀx(t).
If we consider the composite variables 1LH,
η
LH,
1
LF and variables Uk,Uk−1, x(t),
then tk can be written as a degree-two multivariate polynomial. This allows us to
compute [[tk]] using LabHE.
Then, one encrypted iteration of the FGM, where we assume that the cloud has
access to E
(
− 1LH
)
, E
(− ηLH) , E ( 1LFᵀ) , E(x(t)), [[hu]], [[lu]] can be written as
follows. Denote the computation on the inputs mentioned previously as fiter. We use
both Add and ⊕, 	, Mlt and ⊗ for a better visual representation.
[[tk − ρk]] = Mlt
(
E
(−1
L
Fᵀ
)
,E(x(t))
)
⊕Mlt
(
Add
(
IMm,E
(
1
L
H
))
,E (Uk)
)
⊕
⊕Mlt
(
Add
(
E(η) ⊗ IMm,E
(−η
L
H
))
,
(
E(Uk) 	 E(Uk−1)
) )
, (8)
where ρk is the secret obtained by applying fiter on the LabHE secrets of the inputs
of fiter. When the actuator applies the LabHE decryption primitive on [[tk − ρk]],
ρk is removed. Hence, for simplicity, we will write [[tk]] instead of [[tk − ρk]].
Second, let us address how to perform (4b) in a private way. We have to perform
the projection of tk over the feasible domain described by hu and lu , where all the
variables are encrypted, as well as the private update of Uk+1 with the projected
iterate. One solution to the private comparison was described in Section 4.5. The
cloud has [[tk]] and assume it also has the AHE encryptions of the limits [[hu]] and
[[lu]]. The actuator has the master key of the LabHE , as well as ρk , that it computed
offline. The cloud and the actuator will engage in two instances of the DGK protocol
and oblivious transfer: first, to compare tk to hu and obtain an intermediate value of
Uk+1, and second, to compare Uk+1 to lu and to update the iterate Uk+1.
Before calling the comparison protocol 1, described in Section 4.5, between [[hu]]
and [[tk]], as well as between [[lu]] and [[Uk+1]], the cloud should randomize the
order of the inputs, such that, after obtaining the comparison bit, the actuator does
not learn whether the iterate was feasible or not. This is done in lines 8 and 11 in
Protocol 4. Upon the completion of the comparison, the cloud and actuator perform
the oblivious transfer variant, described in Section 4.4, such that the cloud obtains
the intermediate value of [[Uk+1]] and subsequently, update the AHE encryption
of the iterate [[Uk+1]]. At the last iteration, the cloud and actuator perform the
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standard oblivious transfer for the firstm positions in the values such that the actuator
obtains u(t). Finally, because the next iteration can proceed only if the cloud has
access to the full LabHE encryption E(Uk+1), instead of [[Uk+1]], the cloud and
actuator have to refresh the encryption. Specifically, the cloud secret-shares [[Uk+1]]
in [[Uk+1 − rk+1]] and rk+1, and sends [[Uk+1 − rk+1]] to the actuator. The actuator
decrypts it, and, using a previously generated secret, sends back E(Uk+1 − rk+1) =(
Uk+1−rk+1,
[ [
bU
k+1
] ] )
. Then, the cloud recovers theLabHE encryption asE(Uk+1) =
Add(E(Uk+1 − rk+1), rk+1). In what follows, we will outline the private protocols
obtained by integrating the above observations.
5.1 Private protocol
Assume that K, N are fixed and known by all parties. Subscript Si stands for the i-th
subsystem, for i ∈ [M], subscript Set for the Setup, subscript A for the actuator and
subscript C for the cloud.
Protocol 3: Initialization of encrypted MPC
Input: Actuator: fMPC; Subsystems: Ui ; Setup: A, B, P,Q, R.
Output: Subsytems: mpk, upkS i , uskS i , τS i , bS i , [[bS i ]], RS i ; Setup: H, F, η, L, mpk, upkSet,
uskSet, τSet, bSet, [[bSet ]], RSet ; Actuator: usk, upk, τA, bA, [[bA]], RA; Cloud: mpk,
E
(
− 1LH
)
, E
(− ηLH) , E ( 1L Fᵀ) , E(η), [[hu ]], [[lu ]], RC .
Offline:
1: Actuator: Generate (mpk,msk) ← Init(1σ ) and distribute mpk to the others. Also generate a
key usk for itself.
2: Subsystems, Setup: Each get (usk, upk) ← KeyGen(mpk) and send upk to the actuator.
3: Subsystems, Setup, Actuator: Allocate labels to the inputs of function fMPC: τ1, . . . , τv , where
v is the total number of inputs, as follows:
Subsystem i: for xi (t) of size ni , where i denotes a subsystem, generate the corresponding
labels τxi (t ) = [0 1 ni . . . ni − 1]ᵀ .
Setup: for matrix H ∈ RMm×Mm , set l = 0, generate
τH =

l l+1 . . . l+Mm−1
...
...
l+(Mm−1)Mm l+(Mm−1)Mm+1 . . . l+M 2m2−1
 and update l = M2m2, then follow the
same steps for F, starting from l and updating it.
Actuator: follow the same steps as the subsystems and setup, and then generate similar labels
for the iterates Uk starting from the last l, for k = 0, . . . , K − 1.
4: Subsystems, Setup, Actuator, Cloud: Generate randomness for blinding and encryptions R.
5: Subsystems, Setup, Actuator: Perform the offline part of the LabHE encryption primitive. The
actuator also performs the offline part for the decryption. The parties thus obtain b, [[b]].
6: Actuator: Generate initializations for the initial iterate U′0.
7: Actuator: Form the program P = ( fMPC, τ1, . . . , τv ).
Initialization:
8: Setup: Compute H and F from A, B, P,Q, R and then L = λmax(H) and η =
(√κ(H) − 1)/(√κ(H) + 1). Perform the online part of LabHE encryption and send to the
cloud: E
(
− 1LH
)
, E
(− ηLH) , E ( 1L Fᵀ) , E(η).
9: Subsystems: Perform the online part of LabHE encryption and send to the cloud, which
aggregates what it receives into: [[hu ]], [[lu ]].
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Protocol 4: Encrypted MPC step
Input: Actuator: fMPC; Subsystems: xi (t), Ui ; Setup: A, B, P,Q, R.
Output: Actuator: u(t)
Offline + Initialization:
1: Subsystems, Setup, Cloud, Actuator: Run Protocol 3.
Online:
2: Cloud:
[ [ 1
L Fᵀx(t)
] ] ← Mlt (E ( 1L Fᵀ) , E(x(t))) .
3: Actuator: Send the initial iterate to the cloud: E(U′0).
4: Cloud: Change the initial iterate: E(U0) = Add
(
E
(
U′0
)
, r0
)
.
5: Cloud: E (U−1) ← E (U0).
6: for k = 0, . . . , K − 1 do
7: Cloud: Compute [[tk ]] as in Equation (8).
8: Cloud: ([[ak ]], [[bk ]]) ← randomize ([[hu ]], [[tk ]]).
9: Cloud, Actuator: Execute comparison protocol 1; Actuator obtains δk .
10: Cloud, Actuator: [[Uk+1]] ← OT′ ([[ak ]], [[bk ]], δk,msk).
11: Cloud: ([[ak ]], [[bk ]]) ← randomize ([[lu ]], [[Uk+1]]).
12: Cloud, Actuator: Execute comparison protocol 1; Actuator obtains δk .
13: if k!=K-1 then
14: Cloud,Actuator: [[Uk+1]] ← OT′ ([[ak ]], [[bk ]], δk Y 1,msk). Cloud receives [[Uk+1]].
15: Cloud: Send to the actuator
[ [
U′
k+1
] ] ← Add ([[Uk+1]] , [[−rk ]]), where rk is
randomly selected fromMMm .
16: Actuator: Decrypt
[ [
U′
k+1
] ]
and send back E(U′
k+1).
17: Cloud: E (Uk+1) ← Add
(
E
(
U′
k+1
)
, rk
)
.
18: else
19: Cloud, Actuator: u(t) ← OT ([[ak ]]1:m, [[bk ]]1:m, {δk }1:m Y 1,msk). Actuator
receives u(t).
20: end if
21: end for
22: Actuator: Input u(t) to the system.
Lines 3 and 4 ensure that neither the cloud nor the actuator knows the initial point
of the optimization problem.
5.2 Privacy of Protocol 4
Assumption 1An adversary cannot corrupt at the same time both the cloud controller
and the virtual actuator or more than M − 1 subsystems.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, the encrypted MPC solution presented in Proto-
col 4 achieves multi-party privacy (Definition 4).
Proof The components of the protocol: AHE, secret sharing, pseudorandom gener-
ator, LabHE, oblivious transfer and the comparison protocol are individually secure,
meaning either their output is computationally indistinguishable from a random out-
put or they already satisfy Definition 4. We are going to build the views of the
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allowed coalitions and their corresponding simulators and use the previous results
to prove they are computationally indistinguishable.
The cloud has no inputs and no outputs, hence its view is composed solely from
received messages and coins:
VC(∅) =
(
mpk,E
(
− 1
L
H
)
,E
(
− η
L
H
)
,E
(
1
L
Fᵀ
)
,E(η), [[hu]], [[lu]],RC,E(U′0),{
E(Uk), [[ak]], [[bk]], [[Uk+1]] ,msgPr.1,msgOT
}
k∈{0,...,K−1}
)
. (9)
The actuator’s input is the function fMPC and the output is u(t). Then, its view is:
VA( fMPC) =
(
fMPC,mpk,msk, upk,RA,
{
U′k+1,msgPr.1,msgOT
}
k∈{0,...,K−1}
, u(t)
)
,
(10)
which includes the keys mpk,msk because their generation involve randomness.
The setup’s inputs are the model and costs of the system and no output after the
execution of Protocol 4, since it is just a helper entity. Its view is:
VSet (A,B,P,Q,R) =
(
A,B,P,Q,R,mpk, uskSet,RSet
)
. (11)
Finally, for a subsystem i, i ∈ [M], the inputs are the local control action con-
straints and the measured states and there is no output obtained through computation
after the execution of Protocol 4. Its view is:
VSi (Ui, xi(t)) =
(
Ui, xi(t),mpk, uskSi ,RSi
)
. (12)
In general, the indistinguishability between the view of the adversary corrupting
the real-world parties and the simulator is proved through sequential games in which
some real components of the view are replaced by components that could be gener-
ated by the simulator, which are indistinguishable from each other. In our case, we
can directly make the leap between the real view and the simulator by showing that
the cloud only receives encrypted messages, and the actuator receives only messages
blinded by one-time pads. In [3], the proof for the privacy of a quadratic optimization
problem solved in the same architecture is given with sequential games.
For the cloud, consider a simulator SC that generates m˜pk, m˜sk ← Init(1σ),
generates u˜sk j ← KeyGen(m˜pk), for j ∈ {Si, Set, A}, i ∈ [M] and then (τ˜, b˜, [˜[b]])j .
We use (˜·) also over the encryptions to show that the keys are different from the ones
in the view. Subsequently, the simulator encrypts random values of appropriate sizes
to obtain

E
(
− 1LH
)
, E (− ηLH), E ( 1LFᵀ), E˜(η), [[hu]], [[lu]], E(U′0). SC generates the
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coins R˜C as in line 4 in Protocol 3 and obtains E(U0) as in line 4 in Protocol 4. Then,
for each k = {0, . . . ,K − 1}, it computes [[tk]] as in line 7 in Protocol 4 and shuffles[[tk]] and [[hu]] into [[ak]], [[bk]]. SC then performs the same steps as the simulator
for party A in Protocol 1 and gets m˜sgPr.1. Furthermore, SC generates an encryption
of random bits δ˜k and of E(Uk) and performs the same steps as the simulator for
party A as in the proof of Proposition 1 (or the simulator for the standard OT) and
gets m˜sgOT. It then outputs:
SC(∅) =
(
m˜pk,

E
(
− 1
L
H
)
,

E
(
− η
L
H
)
,

E
(
1
L
Fᵀ
)
, E˜(η), [[hu]], [[lu]], R˜C, E(U′0),{E(Uk), ( [[ak]], [[bk]]) , [[Uk+1]], m˜sgPr.1, m˜sgOT}
k∈{0,...,K−1}
)
. (13)
All the values in the view of the cloud in (9) – with the exception of the random
values RC and the key mpk, which are statistically indistinguishable from R˜C and
m˜pk because they are drawn from the same distributions – are encrypted with
semantically secure encryptions schemes (AHE and LabHE). This means they are
computationally indistinguishable from the encryptions of random values in (13),
even with different keys. This happens even when the values from different iterations
are encryptions of correlated quantities. Thus, VC(∅) c≡ SC(∅).
We now build a simulator SA for the actuator that takes as input fMPC, u(t). SAwill
take the same steps as in lines 1, 3–7 in Protocol 3, obtaining m˜pk, m˜sk, u˜pk, u˜sk, τ˜A,
b˜A,[[bA]], R˜A, U˜′0 and instead of line 2, it generates u˜pk j, u˜sk j ← KeyGen(m˜pk)
itself, for j ∈ {Si, Set}, i ∈ [M]. For k = 0, . . . ,K −1, SA performs the same steps as
the simulator for party B in Protocol 1 and gets m˜sgPr.1. Furthermore, SA performs
the same steps as the simulator for party B as in the proof of Proposition 1 (or the
simulator for the standard OT) and gets m˜sgOT. It then outputs:
SA( fMPC, u(t)) =
(
fMPC, m˜pk, m˜sk, u˜pk, R˜A,{U′
k+1, m˜sgPr.1, m˜sgOT
}
k∈{0,...,K−1}
, u(t)
)
.
(14)
All the values in the view of the actuator in (10) – with the exception of the random
values RA and the keys upk, which are statistically indistinguishable from R˜A and
u˜pk because they are drawn from the same distributions and u(t) – are blinded by
random numbers, different at every iteration, which means that they are statistically
indistinguishable from the random values in (14). This again holds even when the
values that are blinded at different iterations are correlated and the actuator knows
the solution u(t), because the values of interest are drowned in large noise. Thus,
VA( fMPC) c≡ SA( fMPC, u(t)).
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The setup and subsystems do not receive any other messages apart from the
master public key (11), (12). Hence, a simulator SSet for the setup and a simulator
SSi for a subsystem i can simply generate m˜pk ← Init(1σ) and then proceed with
the execution of lines 2–5 in Protocol 3 and output their inputs, messages and coins.
The outputs of the simulators are trivially indistinguishable from the views.
When an adversary corrupts a coalition, the view of the coalition contains the
inputs of all parties, and a simulator takes the coalition’s inputs and outputs. The
view of the coalition between the cloud, the setup, and a number l of subsystems is:
VCSl
(
A,B,P,Q,R,{Ui, xi(t)}i∈i1,...,il
)
= VC(∅) ∪ VSet (A,B,P,Q,R)∪
∪VSi1 (Ui1, xi1 (t)) ∪ . . . ∪ VSil (Uil , xil (t)).
A simulator SCSl for this coalition takes in the inputs of the coalition and no output
and performs almost the same steps as SC , SSet , SSi , without randomly generating
the quantities that are known by the coalition. The same argument of having the
messages drawn from the same distributions and encrypted with semantically secure
encryption schemes proves the indistinguishability between VCSl(·) and SCSl(·).
The view of the coalition between the actuator, the setup, and a number l of
subsystems is the following:
VASl
(
fMPC, u(t), A,B,P,Q,R, {Ui, xi(t)}i∈i1,...,il
)
= VA( fMPC, u(t))∪
∪VSet (A,B,P,Q,R) ∪ VSi1 (Ui1, xi1 (t)) ∪ . . . ∪ VSil (Uil , xil (t)).
A simulator SASl for this coalition takes in the inputs of the coalition and u(t) and
performs almost the same steps as SA, SSet , SSi , without randomly generating the
quantities that are now known. The same argument of having the messages drawn
from the same distributions and blinded with one-time pads proves the indistin-
guishability between VASl(·) and SASl(·).
The proof is now complete. 
We can also have the private MPC scheme run for multiple time steps. Protocol 3
can be modified to also generate the labels and secrets for T time steps. Protocol 4
can be run for multiple time steps, and warm starts can be included by adding two
lines such that the cloud obtains E
({
UtK
}
m+1:M
)
and sets E(Ut+10 ) =
[
UtK
ᵀ 0ᵀm
]ᵀ.
5.3 Analysis of errors
As mentioned at the beginning of the section, the values that are encrypted, added
to or multiplied with encrypted values have to be integers. We consider fixed-point
representations with one sign bit, li integer bits and lf fractional bits. We multiply
the values by 2l f then truncate to obtain integers prior to encryption, and, after
decryption, we divide the result by the appropriate quantity (e.g., we divide the
result of a multiplication by 22l f ). Furthermore, the operations can increase the
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number of bits of the result, hence, before the comparisons in Protocol 4 an extra
step that performs interactive truncation has to be performed, because Protocol 1
requires a fixed number of bits for the inputs. Also, notice that when the encryption
is refreshed, i.e., a ciphertext is decrypted and re-encrypted, the accumulation of bits
due to the operations is truncated back to the desired size.
Working with fixed-point representations can lead to overflow, quantization and
arithmetic round-off errors. Thus, we want to compute the deviation between the
fixed-point solution and optimal solution of the FGM algorithm in (4). In order
to bound it, we need to ensure that the number of fractional bits lf is sufficiently
large such that the feasibility of the fixed-point precision solution is preserved, that
the strong convexity of the fixed-point objective function still holds and that the
fixed-point step size is such that the FGM converges. The errors can be written as
states of a stable linear system with bounded disturbances. Bounds on the errors for
the case of public model are derived in [4] and similar bounds can be obtained for the
private model. The bounds on this deviation can be used in an offline step to choose
an appropriate fixed-point precision for the desired performance of the system.
6 Discussion
Secure multi-party computation protocols require many rounds of communication
in general, and the amount of communication depends on the amount of data that
needs to be concealed. This can also be observed in Protocol 4. Therefore, in order
to be able to use this proposed protocol, we need fast and reliable communication
between the cloud and the actuator.
In the architecture we considered, the subsystems are computationally and mem-
ory constrained devices, hence, they are only required to generate the encryptions
for their measurements. The setup only holds constant data, and it only has to com-
pute the matrices in (4) and encrypt them in the initialization step. Furthermore,
we considered the existence of the setup entity for clarity in the exposition of the
protocols, but the data held by the setup could be distributed to the other participants
in the computation. In this case, the cloud would have to perform some extra steps in
order to aggregate the encrypted system parameters (see [5] for a related solution).
Notice that the subsystems and setup do not need to generate labels for the number
of iterations, only the actuator does. The actuator is supposed to be a machine with
enough memory to store the labels and reasonable amount of computation power
such that the encryptions and decryptions are performed in a practical amount of
time (that will be dependent on the sampling time of the system), but less powerful
than the cloud. The cloud controller is assumed to be a server, which has enough
computational power and memory to be capable to deal with the computations on
the ciphertexts, which can be large, depending on the encryption schemes employed.
If fast and reliable communication is not available or if the actuator is a highly
constrained device, then a fully homomorphic encryption solution that is solely
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executed by the cloud might be more appropriate, although its execution can be
substantially slower.
Compared to the two-server MPC with private signals but public model from [4],
where only AHE is required, the MPC with private signals and private model we
considered in this chapter is only negligibly more expensive. Specifically, the cipher-
texts are augmented with one secret that has the number of bits substantially smaller
than the number of bits in an AHE ciphertext, and each online iteration only incurs
one extra round of communication, one decryption and one encryption. All the other
computations regarding the secrets are done offline. This shows the efficiency and
suitability of LabHE for encrypted control applications.
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